Lack of spatial resilience in a recovery process: Case L\u27Aquila, Italy by Contreras D et al.
Technological Forecasting & Social Change 121 (2017) 76–88
Contents lists available at ScienceDirect
Technological Forecasting & Social ChangeLack of spatial resilience in a recovery process: Case L'Aquila, ItalyDiana Contreras a,⁎, Thomas Blaschke b, Michael E. Hodgson c
a Social Vulnerability and Integrated Risk (SVIR) Coordination, Global Earthquake Model – GEM Foundation, Via Ferrata 1, 27100 Pavia, Italy
b Department of Geoinformatics - Z_GIS, University of Salzburg, Schillerstrasse 30/Bauteil 10/2. Stock, 5020 Salzburg, Austria
c Department of Geography, University of South Carolina, Callcott, Room 327-A, Callcott Building, 709 Bull Street, Columbia, SC 29208, USA⁎ Corresponding author.
E-mail addresses: diana.contreras@globalquakemodel
thomas.blaschke@sbg.ac.at (T. Blaschke), hodgsonm@sc.e
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.techfore.2016.12.010
0040-1625/© 2016 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Inca b s t r a c ta r t i c l e i n f oArticle history:
Received 22 February 2016
Received in revised form 28 November 2016
Accepted 22 December 2016
Available online 15 January 2017The lack of coordination between government agencies, involvement of the collaboration networks existing in
the community, and incorporation of spatial planning in the location of the new settlements around L'Aquila
(Italy) after the 2009 earthquake has delayed reconstruction of the city centre. The displaced population was
relocated to 19 new settlements. These new settlements are characterized by a lack of urban facilities. The aim
of this paper was to analyze the relationship between urban facilities, collaboration networks and lack of spatial
resilience in the recovery process in L'Aquila. Specifically, we focused on the preferences of inhabitants to search
for alternative housing sites to the settlements they were originally relocated to, as a proxy for dissatisfaction in
the new settlements around L'Aquila. Our approach consisted of three steps: 1) fieldwork, 2) survey and 3) cor-
relation/regression analysis. The results demonstrated a strong relationship where preference to search for an-
other housing site decreases with increasing number of urban facilities in the settlement and increases with
travel distance to the urban core of L'Aquila.We can conclude that the allocation of facilities was oriented to sup-
ply basic services, but neglected other needs of the community during the recovery process, which reduces its
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L'Aquila1. Introduction
On 6 April 2009 a magnitude 6.3MW earthquake struck the Italian
city of L'Aquila. The epicentre was located 3.4-km to the southwest of
the city at a depth of 10-km. L'Aquila is the capital of the province by
the same name and a major centre in the Abruzzo region with a popu-
lation of 72,800. Its location and a map of ground motion intensity dur-
ing the earthquake are shown in Fig. 1.
The historical city of L'Aquilawas badly damaged, with 308 fatalities,
1500 people injured (202 seriously), 67,500 homeless (Alexander,
2010a), and about 100,000 damaged buildings. The cost of the damage
to buildings/infrastructure was estimated to be 16 billion Euros
(UNIFI, 2010). Reconstruction programs such as, Complessi Antisismici
Sostenibili ed Ecocompatibili (C.A.S.E) and Moduli. Abitativi Provvisori
(M.A.P), constructed housing units for the homeless population in 19
new settlements distributed in various locations on the outskirts of
the city: Sant'Antonio, Sant'Elia, Coppito 2, Sant'Elia2, Gignano, Coppito
3, Bazzano, Sassa, Pagliare di Sassa, Paganica Sud, Cese di Preturo,
Paganica 2, Tempera, Roio Poggio, Roio 2, Collebrincioni, Camarda,
Assergi 2, and Arischia (Contreras et al., 2013). In the C.A.S.E project
11,776 displaced residents from L'Aquila were resettled, while in thes),
n).
access article underMAP project 2468 were resettled. 4276 were receiving a special eco-
nomic contribution for housing, while 478 were paying rent at special
rates (Ambrosetti and Petrillo, 2016).
The location of these new settlements is shown in Fig. 2.
The main criteria for new relocation sites normally are: low hazard
risk, closeness to infrastructure and land tenure ownership (Davidson
et al., 2007). Nevertheless, this expensive housing resettlement solution
was located in conservation lands or farmland (Alexander, 2010b).
They were located in isolated places far from the core city of L'Aquila
with problems such as lack of urban facilities (e.g. churches, schools,
pharmacies, post offices, supermarkets, social centres, sport centres),
lack of spatial connectivity (Contreras et al., 2013), social fragmentation
(Ambrosetti and Petrillo, 2016; Geipel, 1979; Forino, 2014) and function-
al living, and questionable ecological values (Alexander, 2010b; Özerdem
and Rufini, 2013). Some of the resettlements have been abandoned due
to these reasons, the reduced size of the apartments and their condition,
despite their recent construction in 2009 (Spalinger, 2016). The Italian
State is the owner of the land. This artificial resettlement ‘sprawl’ did
not consider either the social or spatial characteristics of L'Aquila, or its
centuries-old relations between the historical centre and its surrounding
neighbourhoods (Forino, 2014; Özerdem and Rufini, 2013). Additionally,
the mismanagement and the slowness of the institutions due to political
issues (Arens, 2014; Vale andCampanella, 2005) delayed the allocation of
financial resources for the reconstruction, impairing livelihood function-
ing (UNU-EHS et al., 2013).the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
Fig. 1. Case study area: L'Aquila (Italy). (a) Location. Source: Google Earth – QuickBird/DigitalGlobe, distributed by European Space Imaging on 11 September 2011. (b) Map of the ground
motion intensity during the earthquake in L'Aquila. Source: USGS.
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due to natural phenomena. In the context of this paper, recovery is de-
fined as: a complex multidimensional long-term process involving
planning, financing, decision making and reconstruction aimed at re-
storing sustainable living conditions to a community or an area, stronglyFig. 2. Location of new settlements, inner city and old town in L'Aquila . Servizio per L'informazio
MICRODIS Project – Commission's Sixth Framework Programme.influenced by vulnerable conditions in thephysical, social, economic, in-
stitutional, cultural and ecological dimensions that existed prior to the
event. Other than reconstructing buildings and infrastructure, the re-
covery process must also address the interaction among a variety of
groups and institutions, with the aim to rebuild people's lives andne Territoriale e la Telematica–Ufficio Sistema Informativo Geografico– RegioneAbruzzo.
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(Contreras et al., 2014).
Some communities have problems tomeet basic needs such as shel-
ter and employment, while others bounce back quickly (Fletcher, 2010).
Each recovery case may vary due to the pre-existing conditions existing
before the disaster event, which are the result of the exposure, the sus-
ceptibility and fragility, and the lack of resilience of the affected commu-
nity (Birkmann et al., 2013).
We adopt the concept of resilience formulated in the framework of
the MOVE Project, a project with the aim to improve vulnerability as-
sessment methods in Europe. In the MOVE project, resilience was de-
fined as the capacity to anticipate, to cope and to recover from
disturbances such as natural phenomena (Birkmann et al., 2013).
The remainder of this paper is organized into six sections. The liter-
ature review starts with the concepts of resilience and urban resilience,
the consequences of relocation after disasters and collaborative net-
works. The next section presents the hypotheses. Themethodology sec-
tion describes the fieldwork, the survey of the new settlements and the
statistical analysis. The results of the correlation and regression analysis
are presented in the next sectionwith the corresponding discussion and
conclusion sections at the end.
2. Literature review
2.1. Resilience concept
The term resilience has been used in many disciplines, including
psychology, natural and human ecology, engineering and geography;
however, there is not an agreed upon definition of resilience. This con-
cept is multifaceted and adaptable to several context and disciplines
(Forino, 2014; Adger, 2000). Holling (1973) defined resilience as the
time required for an ecosystem to return to equilibrium following a per-
turbation. Later, Timmerman (1981) elaborated on the concept, and de-
fined it as the “capacity to adapt to absorb and recover from the
occurrence of a hazardous event”. Godschalk (2003) associates resil-
ience with redundancy, efficiency, autonomy, and adaptability.
Davoudi and Strange (2009) cited by Lu and Stead (2013) define resil-
ience in terms of connectivity, fluidity, contingency, and multiplicity.
Vale and Campanella (2005) consider resilience as the capacity of a
zone to rebound from destruction, while UNISDR (2009) describes it
as the ability of a system to recover in an efficient manner. Zhou et al.
(2010) explained the concept as the capacity to face loss after a disaster
and to recover from it (Forino, 2014). Pelling cited by Guo (2012)) for-
mulated the definition of resilience as “capacity to adjust to threats and
mitigate or avoid harm”. Aldrich (2012) defined resilience in the con-
text of the community, as the capacity of the neighbourhoods to address
crises through coordinated efforts and cooperative activities to achieve
effective and efficient recovery. According to Alexander (2013) the
term used in the context of disaster risk reduction means: “The ability
of a system, community or society exposed to hazards to resist, absorb,
accommodate to and recover from the effects of a hazard in a timely and
efficient manner, including the preservation and restoration of its es-
sential basic structures and functions” (UNISDR, 2009).
In the framework of the Resilience Academy 2013–2014, one of the
highlighted definitions of resiliencewas the power or ability to return to
the original position, structure or function, after being disturbed,
shocked or impacted by stress (UNU-EHS et al., 2013). Recovery in the
resilience paradigm is easier when you have the capacity to anticipate
and cope with stress (Aldrich, 2012).
Vale and Campanella (2005) posed questions about howurban resil-
ience should be developed during the reconstruction process and “Who
should recover which aspect of the city, for whom, in what intention
and by what mechanism.” They argue that a resilient city is a construct-
ed phenomenon in all dimensions, not only the bricks. Urban resilience
is a framework proposed by leaders, discussed and later approved by
citizens. In an urban reconstruction process, there should bemore socialand spatial coherencewith respect to the urban fabric, systems and live-
lihoods (Guo, 2012). According to Guo, the goal of post-disaster recon-
struction, rather than the restoration of the previous condition of the
city, should be to go beyond and improve the urban environment,
through the infrastructure, the seismic considerations in the design
and construction of houses and an efficient urban design. There is a
problematic relationship between rapid reconstruction and urban resil-
ience. To promote urban resilience it is necessary to use the resources
provided by the government to design urban projects which fulfil the
needs of the community (Guo, 2012).
2.2. Urban resilience
According to Coaffee et al. (2009) resilience is part of urbanismand it
is a goal for cities exposed to hazards (Guo, 2012). In the city of
Dujiangyan, China, after the Great Sichuan Earthquake or Wenchuan
Earthquake, the reconstruction process was taken as an opportunity
for territorial development in the economic dimension. Davidson et al.
(2007) argue that housing reconstruction projects face the same chal-
lenges as low-cost housing in developing countries such as: chaotic
scene, resources are in scarce and supply, the projectmust be completed
as soon as possible and it is necessary to take the opportunity to reduce
the vulnerability. Nevertheless, the top-down approach (Özerdem and
Rufini, 2013) of planning usually takes into account neither the com-
plexity of the cultural landscape, nor the needs or potential of the
local conditions and users (El-Masri and Kellet, 2001). Therefore this
kindof approach produces socio-spatial incoherence:massiveurbaniza-
tion without any continuity to the urban history of the city (Guo, 2012;
El-Masri and Kellet, 2001) and therefore the alteration of the social, eco-
nomic, environmental and the identity of the territory (Özerdem and
Rufini, 2013). In addition, the absence of stakeholder involvement in
the government-led reconstruction efforts produced a problematic
urban fragmentation (Guo, 2012). Only the strategies for recovery and
reconstruction formulated by affected people will respond to their real
needs (Maskrey, 1989). The literature regarding the performance of
housing projects, including post-disaster reconstruction projects high-
lights the role of community participation (Davidson et al., 2007).
Three main aspects of post-disaster urban reconstruction were
highlighted by Guo (2012): 1) socio-spatial coherence in the urban
plans and projects, 2) temporal continuity of the urban interventions,
and 3) interdisciplinary multi-stakeholder integration and communica-
tion. These post-disaster aspects link to the concept of spatial resilience
formulated by Cumming (2011), who defines resilience as “mainte-
nance of key components and relationships and the continuity of
these through time” (Ifejika Speranza et al., 2014). To achieve these
goals, it is necessary to go beyond repair or reconstruction, to elaborate
on urban components, elements, networks, dynamics and capacities. It
is essential to deal with scales, tools, approaches and intensity of the in-
tervention regarding planning and design (Guo, 2012).
According to Ganor and Ben-Lavy (2003) the basic ingredients of
community resilience, termed as the “Six Cs” are: communication, coop-
eration, cohesion, coping, credibility and credo. McCreight (2010) de-
fined five characteristics of resilience in the post-disaster phase:
Personal and familiar socio-physical wellbeing, organizational and insti-
tutional restoration, economic and commercial resumption of services
and productivity, restoring infrastructural systems integrity and opera-
tional regularity of public safety and government.
2.3. Relocation processes
Relocation represents a change in the ‘place’where people lived and
worked. Oliver-Smith (2009) stated that displacement affects every as-
pect of life, hence it needs careful planning, in order to build successful
communities (Fernando and Punchihewa, 2013). Relocation projects
which are not a participatory process usually have adverse results. The
property-owner should have priority in the decisions regarding the
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Manyena (2006) provides guidance on including local communities in
the decision-making process during the recovery, in order to respond
to the spatial, socio-economic and cultural needs of the affected zone
(Forino, 2014). According to Fernando and Punchihewa (2013), due to
the lack of planning by the authorities, relocated communities tend to
be impoverished. These conclusionswere based on the results of the Co-
lombo City Flood Prevention and Human Environment Development
Project (FPHEP), implemented by the government of Sri Lanka (GoSL)
to relocate shanty dwellers as a strategy to reduce the flood exposure
of the population. In the case of Badowita in Colombo (Sri Lanka)
which was the largest relocated settlement, besides other problems,
the residents complained about the condition of urban facilities such
as poor road access, lack of street lights and community centres. Accord-
ing to Fernando (2006), residents complained about the ‘Home Owner
Driven Approach’ of the project, because it did not exist. In fact, some
of the displaced people sold their allocated land and left the settlement,
in order to improve their socio-economic conditions (Fernando and
Punchihewa, 2013). The lack of involvement of the homeless communi-
ty due to the earthquake and therefore the inadequate selection of the
new sites for relocation lead to the rejection of the new settlements.
In the case of permanent post-disaster houses (PDHs) built-up with
the financial support of the Ministry of Public Works and Settlements
after the earthquake in Turkey in 2000, some beneficiaries refused to
move into the new settlements due to the distance from the villages
and/or lack of proper roads. Research has demonstrated that the partic-
ipation in housing projects play an important role in empowering com-
munity members, therefore they become part in the decision-making
process (Davidson et al., 2007).
2.4. Collaboration networks
Networks are understood as structures depending on social relations
betweenmembers interested in building shared values, trust andmutu-
ality in order to carry out collective actions (Keast and Brown, 2002). A
network could be a set of nodes and ties representing a relationship be-
tween them (Brass et al., 2004). Provan et al. (2007) define a network as
a group of organizations connected to achieve a common goal.
Collaboration is defined by Bodin andNohrstedt (2016) as exchange
of information, common planning, coordination of activities and discus-
sion about common tasks. These authors identified eleven tasks: public
information, mass-media contacts, psychological care, intra and inter
organizational relations, evacuation, situation awareness, infrastruc-
ture, fire extinction, logistic and supply, and public donations. Nine
components of collaboration were identified by Mayer and Kenter:
communication, consensus, decision-making, diverse stakeholders,
goals, leadership, shared resources, shared vision, social capital and
trust (Mayer and Kenter, 2015). The aim is to develop” a collaborative
advantage in which several organizations together achieve a goal that
individual organizations cannot achieve alone (Huxham, 2003). The
method used by actors to select collaboration partners after a disaster
is not random. The interdependency of the tasks, influence the selection
of collaboration partners (Bodin and Nohrstedt, 2016). As soon as the
benefits of collaboration are visible for the participants, it “simply hap-
pens”. The origin of the collaborative difficulties is the uncertainty com-
ing from the changing environment (Brandenburger and Nalebuff,
1997). Baker et al. (Ellen et al., 2011) suggests that knowledge and
other important resources are accessed and created through collabora-
tive relationships.
Humanitarian organizations define collaboration networks as the
system-wide structure of inter-organizational coordination (Charles et
al., 2010; Moore et al., 2003). There are three kinds of categories of col-
laboration in the context of relief operations: Coordination by com-
mand, when there is a central coordination and common territorial
areas of responsibility; command by consensus, when there are inter-
agency meetings; and command by default, which involves regularcommunications between desk officers and civil military operations
centers. The last is themore common collaboration during the recovery
phase. Collaboration networks regarding humanitarian organizations
must include local governments. The selection of the most suitable col-
laboration mode is always difficult especially in the cases of humanitar-
ian crisis (Charles et al., 2010).
Inter-organizational networks do not guaranty positive outcomes
(Ellen et al., 2011). Networks can fail, and formally constructed net-
works tends to fail more than networks emerging out of prior relation-
ships (Provan et al., 2007). It is expected that increased collaboration
leads to an improvement in performance (Ellen et al., 2011). Natural di-
sasters pose challenges beyond the capacities of single actors. There is a
consensus that the collective actions are more effective when they are
undertaken in the framework of collaborative governance networks
supporting development of joint solutions, resource sharing, and coor-
dination avoiding duplication of work (Bodin and Nohrstedt, 2016).
Multi-organizational coordination and collective action is required by
the governance of a disaster management network. The effectiveness
of cross-sector collaborative networks in dealing with disasters was al-
ready demonstrated (Vasavada, 2013; Eide et al., 2013; Menya and
K'Akumu, 2016).
The main barriers to implement collaboration networks are: lack of
mutual understanding due to the diversity of actors, lack of transparen-
cy and accountability, insufficient commitment on all levels, lack of clar-
ity on roles and responsibilities, lack of change management and lack of
funding for activities that have no direct, visible and dedicated field ap-
plication. The respective solutions are: choice of the right ecosystem of
factors, incentives for shared information on mutual experiences and
existing initiatives, involvement of key actors of the value chain, devel-
op clear and jointly agreed roles and responsibilities to encourage com-
mitment of actors (Charles et al., 2010; Boughen and LeTurque, 2008;
Faucher, 2009; Van Wassenhove, 2006). Based on other research three
mechanisms are essential for effective networked responses for disaster
management: high level of confidence amongkey actors, high coordina-
tion with clearly defined authorities and configuration of the right type
of organization in the network (Vasavada, 2013; Moynihan, 2007;
Moynihan, 2009; Boin and ‘t Hart, 2010). Vasavada (2013) considers
five sectors in disaster management networks: Government, academia,
business, international funding agencies and non-profit sector. A large
number of organizations are required to come together for recovery ef-
forts after an earthquake (Menya and K'Akumu, 2016; Kapucu and
Garayev, 2011). The network size pose a challenge for the coordination
of Non-profit Organizations (NPOs), the implementation of policies and
projects and the needs or information sharing and resource manage-
ment according to the level (Vasavada, 2013).
Community is defined as a group of people, who in difficult situation
such in the post-disaster phase, are able to independently collaborate
and develop strategies for sustainable recovery. Yasui contends that
population recovery is an essential part of post-disaster recovery
(Yasui, 2007). Moreover community resilience is termed as a bottom-
up approach based on collaborative and independent organization,
local knowledge, skills and resources, which are focused on improving
the social dynamics of the community and secure the sustainability
after the disaster (Fois and Forino, 2014)
Forino considers grassroots, defined as non-profit groups that use
the association form of organization, as a collaborative network option
for the case of L'Aquila (Forino, 2014). According to Coles and Buckle
(2004), the engagement of grassroots is unavoidable in affected places,
and in fact is an action that encourage spatial ethics, improves recovery
and builds social capital (Chandrasekhar, 2012; Jha et al., 2010). During
February 2010, hundreds of volunteers worked each Sunday to remove
debris from streets of the city centre as a demonstration against the
slowness of the reconstruction that delayed their return to the city cen-
tre (Özerdem and Rufini, 2013). However, these kind of organizations
need external support from national and/or international organizations
to manage resources, and often do not influence the decision-making
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cea and contradictory effects can reduce the impact of local engagement
(Davidson et al., 2007), resulting in individualism, instead of collective
initiatives (Fois and Forino, 2014; Chandrasekhar, 2012).The grassroots
in L'Aquila are identified as emergent groups (EGs) and they are made
up of citizens whowork together in order to achieve common goals rel-
evant to disasters, but without any formal organization (Forino, 2014;
Saunders and Kreps, 1987; Stallings and Quarantelli, 1985; Kreps,
1984; Kreps and Bosworth, 1993).
Homeless people were relocated in hotels on coastal areas far away
from jobs and families, eliminating the opportunity to regain pre-
existing collaborative networks. The same practice was implemented
after the 1976 earthquake in Friuli and the result was the same: alter-
ation in collaborative networks and modifications of the habits of the
community (Forino, 2014). The urban planning of the CASE project in
L'Aquila did not include any collective place that constitutes the matrix
of the social and relational system, such as local shops, squares or any
kind of public space, where people use to socialize and meet (Forino,
2014; Hajek, 2013). As an example of the importance of the urban facil-
ities, Oktari et al. (2015) highlight the important role of schools in the
development of knowledge for building resilience in a coastal commu-
nity in Banda Aceh, Indonesia. These authors brought into the light the
collaboration between the school and the community to improve school
services and based on their findings they propose the School-communi-
ty Collaborative Networks (SCCN) model. As small advance, the collab-
orative networks developed by some EGs in L'Aquila found funding to
build up a multifunctional centre (auditorium, library and playground
for children) in order to have a social space and avoid the immigration
of young people (Forino, 2014). Another example of the success of col-
laborative networks to pursue resilience was the community of
Pescomaggiore, which rejected the housing solutions proposed by the
government after the earthquake in L'Aquila and developed a self-
built ecovillage (Fois and Forino, 2014).3. Hypothesis
The resettlement in the disaster recovery process for urban cities is
problematic because of high land values and competing uses (e.g. con-
servation land, farmland, etc.). Contreras et al. (2013) demonstrated a
positive correlation between the level of dissatisfaction with the place
people relocated and the distance and travel time to the city centre in
L'Aquila. In the present paper, we want to demonstrate the lack of spa-
tial resilience in the recovery process in L'Aquila emanating from the
lack of involvement of the collaboration networks existing in the com-
munity to produce livable settlements. Our research hypothesis is the
dissatisfaction of the displaced population in the resettlements is relat-
ed to the lack of enough supporting urban facilities in the resettlements.
Urban facilities are not only sources of services, they constitute sources
of information and employment, and the absence of these facilities gen-
erates the desire to migrate as expressed in the site surveys (UNIFI,
2011). Services and facilities contribute not only to the functioning
and the cohesion of a community, but also to build-up social capital, a
significant element in a successful post-disaster recovery (Brown et
al., 2010).This absence of urban facilities does not facilitate the develop-
ment of collaborative networks among the communities located there.
According to Chamlee-Wright et al. (Chamlee-Wright and Storr, 2009)
community centres, as anchoring organizations provide ‘club goods’ to
communities in the post-disaster phase (Aldrich, 2012).
We also consider the number of inhabitants per settlement, and
again distance and travel time as part of our methodology to confirm
that if the attachment level to the new settlements is low, it hinders
the recovery process and hence the resilience of the city.
As a result of the relocation, inhabitants must commute each day by
private car or local buses to the city centre, or to other cities nearby. The
consequences of the population displacement may increasesocioeconomic vulnerability due to the lack of basic services and sources
of employment.
4. Methodology
This research included three steps: (1) fieldwork, to inventory the
urban facilities in the resettlements, (2) surveys of the displaced popu-
lation, and (3) statistical analysis using correlation/regression analysis
to test and examine the relationship between distance, travel time,
urban facilities, inhabitants, access to urban facilities, location satisfac-
tion, and lack of resilience. Our measure of “dissatisfaction” is the pref-
erence to move to another site obtained from a survey.
4.1. Fieldwork
The case area included the core of L'Aquila and the new settlements
for the displaced population. In 2010, one year after the earthquake, five
new settlements visited were: Cese di Preturo, Coppito 2, Coppito 3,
Sassa y Pagliare di Sassa.
The nine resettlements visited in 2012were: Sant'Antonio, Sant'Elia,
Sant'Elia2, Gignano, Bazzano, Paganica sud, Tempera, Camarda and
Assergi2. The final five resettlementswere visited in fieldwork conduct-
ed in 2014, five years after the earthquake: Paganica 2, Roio Poggio,
Roio2, Collebrincioni, and Arischia, located to the north, south and east
of L'Aquila. The monitoring schedule, tools and methods is presented
in Table 1.
The housing includes solar cells either on the roof or balcony rails,
seismic isolation at the base, and the ground floor is always used as a
parking space (see Fig. 3a and b). In all new resettlements there are
some basic urban facilities (see Fig. 3c and d). With the exception of
Sant'Antonio which is close to the core of L'Aquila and had pre-existing
facilities before the earthquake, the supporting urban facilities around
the new settlements are scarce. In Sassa and Camarda there is onemul-
tipurpose centre (see Fig. 3e); and in Sant'Antonio, Gignano and
Bazzano there is a basketball court (see Fig. 3f).
Three new settlements – Assergi2, Collenbrincioni and Arischia –
have almost no urban facilities. Despite being the farthest settlements
from the core of L'Aquila, there is only one bus stop, a park and one or
two more urban facilities. The frequency of urban facilities available in
each new settlement is presented in Fig. 4.
The fieldwork observations were supported by searching in Google
Maps for the existing urban facilities around each new settlement,
which were within a 10 min walking distance (457,2 m) (Mesev,
2007). This parameter was established by Mesev to determine the
level of segregated land use; however, this paper uses an adapted ver-
sion of this concept to determine segregated building use, as all new set-
tlements there is exclusively contain housing.
4.2. Survey
TheMICRODIS project (UNIFI, 2010),was a project carried out by the
University of Florence, with the aim to study the epidemiological, social
and economic effects of the earthquake in L'Aquila. This project included
a survey of the inhabitants of the new settlements. In the course of the
MICRODIS project, the new settlements to which homeless people
from L'Aquila were relocated were geo-referenced. MICRODIS (UNIFI,
2011) extracted data from a housing demand census, where 153 people
from different households were requested to rank their preference of
searching for a new settlement. The MICRODIS project compared the
number of families located in resettlements that were not in their first
choice, and also interviewed people, who considered the site in which
they were relocated, as the worst option and were currently looking
for a new place to live. Based on the data collected and processed, the
index of site preference was derived. The households were relocated
in the new settlements, far away from their former houses, because
Table 1
Monitoring schedule of the post-disaster recovery progress in L'Aquila, Italy.
(Source: Adapted from Contreras (2016) (Contreras, 2016).)
Timeline Remote sensing Ground observations
Geographic information system
Na Year Month Sensor Analysis Month Tools Software/Applications
1 2010 April GPS
Analogue maps
interviews
Arc GIS 9.3–10
Google Earth
Google Maps
2011 September Quickbird OBIA
GIS
3 2012 September GPS
Analogue maps
Arc GIS 10.1
Google Earth
Google Maps
5 2014 April GPS
Analogue maps
interviews
Arc GIS 10.3
Google Earth
Google Maps
7
10
2016
2023b April Quickbird OBIA
GIS
July
April
GPS
Analogue maps
interviews
Arc GIS 10.4
Google Earth
Google Maps
a Number of years after the earthquake.
b Fieldwork planned.
Fig. 3.Newsettlements built around L'Aquila (Italy) to accommodate the homeless survivors of the earthquake in 2009. a) Collebrincioni (2014). b) Sant' Elia 2 (2012). c) Roio 2 (2014). d)
Arischia (2014). e) Camarda (2012), and f) Gignano (2012). Photos: Diana Contreras.
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Fig. 4. Number of urban facilities available in the new settlements in L'Aquila (Italy). Source: Authors' own: Based on ‘Servizio per L'Informazione Territoriale e la Telematica' Ufficio
Sistema Informativo Geografico, Regione Abruzzo, MICRODIS project, Commission’s Sixth Framework Programme.
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2013).
In this survey three age groups - elders (people 65 years and above,
so called ‘transport captives’), adults with children (aged 19 to 64), and
teenagers (aged 15 to 18), were asked to evaluate also the importanceTable 2
Comparison of the distance and travel time to L'Aquila core (Italy), the number of inhabitants, a
site (interpreted as the level of dissatisfaction with current settlement). Source: Authors' own.of different types of urban facility through allocating weights based on
this importance. The results of this survey are utilized here to examine
the relationship between, and preferences to search for another site
(levels of satisfaction/dissatisfaction), the number of urban facilities at
the new settlement, the number of inhabitants per settlement, and thend the number of urban facilities per settlement with the preference to search for another
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Table 2).
In this particular research, we only use responses from the adults
with families group, because these people constitute the group in pro-
ductive age. We use the assumption this group will require more
urban facilities for both services and employment than young people
or elders. The weights allocated to each category of urban facilities by
adults with families are shown in Fig. 5.
These datawas comparedwith the facilities available in the new set-
tlements (see Fig. 6). While commercial, education, health and religious
facilities were given high importance by those surveyed the majority of
available urban facilities in the new settlementswere parks (amenity fa-
cilities) and bus stops (transport facilities), followed by a much lower
occurrence of restaurants, hotels and stores (commercial facilities),
then in decreasing frequency sport facilities, health services, banks, of-
fice facilities and other urban facilities.
4.3. Statistical analysis
We express the relationship between variables statistically in two
analyses: correlation and regression. We removed one observation -
Sant'Antonio - from the analysis, as the urban facilities were available
here pre-earthquake and it was clearly a statistical outlier (considerably
more urban facilities than all other resettlements) in the statistical
analysis.
We used bivariate correlation to test for the strength of the correla-
tion, assuming a linear relationship. The test was one-tailed as we have
one directional hypothesis: the less number of urban facilities in a new
settlement the greater the preference to move to another place. Finally,
we performed a multiple regression analysis to test the relative predic-
tive power of each variable in a set. The correlation coefficient does not
give any indication about causality per se. However, we interpret the co-
efficient of determination R2 as a proxy for the overall explanation of
statistical variation (Field, 2005).
5. Results
The correlation between distance and travel time to the city centre of
L'Aquila and the preference tomove to another placewas demonstrated
in previous research (Contreras et al., 2013). However, in this researchFig. 5.Relativeweights allocated to each category of urban facilities by adultswith families
(with larger values indicate a greater importance). Adapted from: Contreras et al. (2014).we explore the hypothesis that dissatisfaction is a function of both prox-
imity (distance and travel time) to the city centre and the number of in-
habitants and number of urban facilities in the new settlements.
5.1. Correlation analysis
We demonstrated statistically the correlation between the lack of
urban facilities around the new settlements with the preference to
search for another site, interpreted as level of dissatisfactionwith the re-
location and the distance to central L'Aquila (see Table 3). As the num-
ber of urban facilities in a settlement increases the preference to search
for another site (dissatisfaction with the relocation) decreases
(r=−0.445). There is a strong positive correlation between the prefer-
ence to move to another site (level of dissatisfaction) , distance (r =
0.703) and travel time (r= 0.716) to the city center. There is no corre-
lation between the number of urban facilities in a resettlement and dis-
tance to the centre in L'Aquila (r=0.005), travel time (r=−0.116) or
the number of inhabitants (r = −0.068) in the resettlement. As dis-
tance and travel time to the city centre are highly correlated (i.e.
representing the same concept)we only used travel time in themultiple
regression as it is more intuitive and with a slightly higher correlation
with dissatisfaction (0.716 versus 0.703). It would be expected the
number of urban facilities is monotonically related to the number of in-
habitants. However, for the L'Aquila settlements, the number of urban
facilities is unrelated to the number of inhabitants (r = −0.068 and
p= 0.394; see Table 3).
5.2. Regression analysis
The multiple linear regression model (Table 4) relating dissatisfac-
tion to travel time to the city centre, the number of inhabitants in a set-
tlement, and accessible number of urban facilities was statistically
significant with a high correlation coefficient (0.849). The value of R2
(0.722) demonstrates that travel time, the number of inhabitants, and
the number of facilities together account for 72% of the variation in
the preference to move to another site (level of dissatisfaction). All
three independent variables were statistically significant (i.e. different
from 0.0) at the 0.1 probability level. Travel time to the city centre is
clearly the most important predictive variable as the significance level
was very high (0.000) and the standardized beta weight (0.622) was
higher than the number of inhabitants (−0.277) or number of urban fa-
cilities (−0.371). The number of accessible urban facilities is the second
most important followed by the number of inhabitants. Interpretation
of the coefficient sign indicates dissatisfaction increases with increasing
travel time and decreaseswith increasing number of urban facilities and
number of inhabitants.
When the number of urban facilities in the new settlement de-
creases, the preference to search for another living location increases.
6. Discussion
In this researchwe examined the preference tomove to another site
(dissatisfaction) jointly with the number of facilities and number of in-
habitants in each new settlement and travel time to the city centre. The
correlation between the lack of urban facilities in the new settlements
and the preference to move to another place, interpreted as dissatisfac-
tion, confirms our hypothesis of lack of spatial resilience, because there
is neither recovery, nor resilience in a city where relocated people are
not willing to stay due to the lack of employment and services. This
fact hinders the recovery and then the resilience of the community.
The result of the regression analysis in which travel time to the core
L'Aquila, the lack of urban facilities, and number of inhabitants accounts
for over 72% of the variation in preference to look for another housing
location, also confirm our hypothesis of lack of resilience. These factors
generated a preference for residents to search for another site (as a
proxy for dissatisfaction), which confirms previous research,
Fig. 6. Urban facilities available in the new settlements built to accommodate the displaced population from the earthquake in 2009.
Source: Authors' own.
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community is not involved (Fernando and Punchihewa, 2013). This
fact supports the statement from Davidson et al. (2007), who claims
that the lack of early involvement of the community in the decision-
making process produce a high level of dissatisfaction and UNDRO
(1982) which declared that the key to success is the participation of
the local community. Therewas a “100% campaign” launched by the cit-
izens' committees in L'Aquila for demanding 100% participation, recon-
struction and transparency. These committees emerged in the camps,
community centres, parishes, political movements and the university
(Özerdem and Rufini, 2013). This is a kind of collaborative network
which should have hadmore influence in the recovery process avoiding
the top-down approach implemented by the government. The method
used by actors to select collaboration partners after a disaster is notTable 3
Pearson's one-tailed bivariate correlation between the number of urban facilities in the new se
travel time to the L'Aquila core (Italy), and the number of inhabitants in each settlement. Sour
Urban facilities
Urban facilities Pearson correlation 1
Sig. (1-tailed)
N 18
Preference Pearson correlation −0.445⁎
Sig. (1-tailed) 0.032
N 18
Distance Pearson correlation 0.005
Sig. (1-tailed) 0.493
N 18
Time Pearson correlation −0.116
Sig. (1-tailed) 0.324
N 18
Inhabitants Pearson correlation −0.068
Sig. (1-tailed) 0.394
N 18
The bold figures in the table are the most representative values for the research.
⁎ Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (1-tailed).
⁎⁎ Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (1-tailed).random. The interdependency of the tasks, influence the selection of
collaboration partners. The actors have freedom not only to select the
collaboration partners, but also the tasks on which they want to be en-
gaged (Bodin and Nohrstedt, 2016). The top-down approach did not in-
clude enough urban facilities to satisfy the needs of education, health,
recreation and meeting of the inhabitants in the new settlements caus-
ing the correlation between the preferences to move to another site
(dissatisfaction) with the number of facilities and discouraging the
emergence of collaborative networks inside the new settlements and/
or among them and the core city. The problem is that the typical collab-
oration network coordinated by command (Charles et al., 2010) of the
national government, structured for the relief phase (Contreras, 2016)
continued working during the early recovery and the recovery phases,
when the coordination by consensus (Charles et al., 2010) among thettlements, the preference to search for another site (dissatisfaction), the distance and the
ce: Authors' own.
Preference
(Dissatisfaction) Distance Time Inhabitants
−0.445⁎ 0.005 −0.116 −0.068
0.032 0.493 0.324 0.394
18 18 18 18
1 0.703⁎⁎ 0.716⁎⁎ −0.173
0.001 0.000 0.246
18 18 18 18
0.703⁎⁎ 1 0.824⁎⁎ −0.053
0.001 0.000 0.417
18 18 18 18
0.716⁎⁎ 0.824⁎⁎ 1 0.064
0.000 0.000 0.401
18 18 18 18
−0.173 −0.053 0.064 1
0.246 0.417 0.401
18 18 18 18
Table 4
Results from regression analysis between preference to search for another site (dissatis-
faction), and number of urban facilities in the new settlements, the number of inhabitants,
the distance to the core L'Aquila (Italy), and the travel time from the new settlements to
the city center of L'Aquila. Source: Authors' own.
Model Variables entered Variables removed Method
1 Time, Inhabitant, Urban facilities Enter
aDependent variable: Preference (dissatisfaction)
bAll requested variables entered
Model summarya
Model R R2 Adjusted R2 Std. error of the estimate
1 0.849 0.722 0.662 1.5023
aPredictors: (Constant), Time, Inhabitants, Urban facilities
ANOVAa
Model Sum of squares df Mean square error F Sig.
1 Regression 81.861 3 27.287 12.091 .000b
Residual 31.595 14 2.257
Total 113.456 17
aDependent variable: Preference (Dissatisfaction)
bPredictors: (Constant), Time, Inhabitants, Urban facilities
Coefficientsa
Model Unstandardized
coefficients
Standardized
coefficient
B Std.
error
Beta t Sig.
1 (Constant) 3.814 1.908 1.998 0.065
Urban
facilities
−0.411 0.157 −0.371 −2.610 0.021
InhabitantS −0.001 0.001 −0.277 −1.962 0.070
Time 0.496 0.106 0.663 4.663 0.000
a Dependent variable: Preference (Dissatisfaction).
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necessary actions for the recovery.
Moreover, the statistical analysis demonstrated that there is no cor-
relation between the number of inhabitants per settlement and the
number of urban facilities in each one,which is anunacceptablemistake
in urban planning. Therefore, the urban facilities available in the new
settlements do not meet the needs of its inhabitants neither in quality
nor in quantity.
According to the definition of resilience adopted by us, the new
fragmented urban morphology of L'Aquila does not contribute to the
spatial resilience of the city. Relocation of people into conservation
land or rural farmland (Özerdem and Rufini, 2013; Fois and Forino,
2014; Alexander, 2012), results in a high land resource impact (LRI)
(Mesev, 2007). It demonstrates the lack of capacity to anticipate the oc-
currence of an earthquake in a middle hazard seismic zone and to effi-
ciently cope with the needs of land for housing. This poor planning
may explain as well the lack of urban facilities in the design of the
new settlements, as well as the unreasonable public transport frequen-
cies and route connections to L'Aquila (Castellani, 2014). It demon-
strates that collaboration arrangements that fail to meet structures
and scales of the institutional and the biophysical environment results
in negative outcomes (Bodin and Nohrstedt, 2016).
The slow recovery in the city centre and the lack of urban facilities in
the new settlements after eight years demonstrate a limited capacity to
recover, which is a component of resilience. These arguments demon-
strate a lack of capacity to address the impact of the event in several di-
mensions and a lack of resilience based on the segregated use of the
buildings in the new settlements. This segregation locates people far
from their places of employment (livelihood) and away from other
key services. This reduces their capacity to cope with and to absorb
the impact of the earthquake, both of which are elements of resilience
(Birkmann et al., 2013). An example of a coping capacity used in thenew settlements in response to the lack of urban facilities is that resi-
dents use cars as ‘mobile stores’, which sell fish, vegetables and fruits.
People may also use tents as market stalls or as multipurpose rooms,
for example to host dance courses (see Fig. 7 a, b, c, d, e and f). Impor-
tance of specific urban facilities varies by age group. We cannot forget
that community resilience cover four interrelated dimensions: econom-
ic, social, organizational and technical (Bruneau et al., 2003; Jung and
Song, 2015). High levels of resilience encourage mitigation, response,
and recovery (Jung and Song, 2015).
7. Conclusions
Resilience should be themain principle in guiding urban reconstruc-
tion to reduce emerging vulnerability in urban environments. The lack
of spatial resilience in L'Aquila is demonstrated in the lack of ability to
return to at least the original situation before the earthquake (UNU-
EHS et al., 2013). It is unlikely that L'Aquila can be considered a resilient
city, where the reconstruction of the most affected areas of the city is
still ongoing and where people express dissatisfaction of the place
where they were relocated. Some residents even abandon their new
houses (Spalinger, 2016), because of the distance and the travel time
to the inner city, the condition and the size of the apartments and the
lack of facilities in this place. According to several authors, every liveli-
hood systemhas the capacity to adjust to shocks, impacts or distortions,
absorb them and later return to their functionality. Nevertheless, liveli-
hoods can go beyond tolerance thresholds and stop functioning tempo-
rarily or permanently (UNU-EHS et al., 2013). In the case of L'Aquila, the
city has been malfunctioning for 8 years. From the characteristics of re-
silience listed by McCreight (2010) with respect to resilience in the
post-disaster phase, only the restoration of infrastructural systems
(Esposito et al., 2012) and the regularity in the operation of public safety
has been achieved in L'Aquila (Aldrich, 2012; Contreras, 2016). There is
awareness among the government in L'Aquila about this situation and
they are working to solve these problems.
Authors such as Dacy andKunreuther (1969) consider that the rapid
inflow of capital for reconstruction may benefit a community affected
by a disaster (Aldrich, 2012). Unfortunately this was not the case in
L'Aquila. In 2006, Zandi et al. (2006) stated that if government support
does not arrive quickly after the event “confidence rapidly flags, busi-
nesses are not reopened, and residents leave the region” (Aldrich,
2012), this has been the case in L'Aquila in the last 8 years.
As in the case of Sichuan (China), the government in L'Aquilawas fo-
cused on solving the housing problem quickly, without a holistic ap-
proach which considered the urban history (Guo, 2012). The housing
solution in L'Aquila was decided 22 days after the earthquake during
the relief phase (Contreras, 2016). This decision addressed the problem
of quantity, but negatively impacted quality of life and closed the door
to any mechanism of community participation (Alexander, 2010a;
Özerdem and Rufini, 2013; Guo, 2012). The great paradox in L'Aquila
lies on the fact that the C.A.S.E. project, conceived as “temporary hous-
ing”; eventually resulted in a permanent housing solution characterized
with a series of unchangeable facts (Forino, 2014; Özerdem and Rufini,
2013; Alexander, 2012).
The urbanmorphology of L'Aquila after the earthquakewith thenew
19 settlements around the core city is a typical case demonstrating the
dysfunctions and inefficiencies of urban sprawl (Mesev, 2007), in
which the socio-spatial coherence (Guo, 2012) is broken and stimulates
the use of the private car. While people in productive age would like
more supermarkets, childcare facilities, primary schools and pharma-
cies; themost prevalent urban facilities available in the new settlements
are parks and bus stops, followed at a much lower volume by restau-
rants, hotels and stores. Another approach would be a correlation anal-
ysis including the weights allocated by the community to each facility
according to their relative importance. It will allow us to not only to
measure resilience but also the progress of recovery based on the indi-
cator of building use proposed by Contreras et al. (2014).
Fig. 7. Supplementary urban facilities in the new settlements. a) Sport furniture in Gignano (2012); b) Mobile furniture store in Camarda (2012); c) Mobile grocery store in Camarda
(2012); d) Mobile grocery store in Paganica 2 (2014);e) Mobile fish market in Paganica 2 (2014); f) Small scale crops in Roio Poggio (2014). Photos: Diana Contreras.
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the door to grassroots involvement, justified in the urgency of provide
housing solutions (Forino, 2014).The spatial fragmentation (Forino,
2014) of the city and the lack of common facilities for inhabitants to
meet impedes the development of collaborative networks necessary
to build-up resilience. It might be possible to create collaborative net-
works inside each new settlement, but they need at least a facility to
gather and according to our observations, there were only two tents
that serves as churches in Coppito 2 and 3 (2010) and one multifunc-
tional room in Camarda in 2012. Collaboration is amethod to solve com-
plex societal problems (Bodin and Nohrstedt, 2016) and could be a
solution for the problems in the new settlements in L'Aquila. This is be-
cause any of the tasks in collaboration networks identified by Bodin and
Nohrstedt (2016) relevant for the case of L'Aquila such as public infor-
mation, mass-media contacts, intra and inter-organizational relations
were not considered by the actors involved in the recovery of the city.All the collaborations components listed by Mayer and Kenter (2015)
were ignored.
The main barriers to implement a collaboration network in L'Aquila
were the lack ofmutual understanding (Charles et al., 2010), confidence
and coordination (Vasavada, 2013) due to the diversity of actors, be-
cause the Major of the city for the time of the earthquake belonged to
the opposition party of the government. The lack of changemanagement
(Charles et al., 2010) or the right organization of the network (Vasavada,
2013), which could had been solved with a participatory approach.
Nevertheless, the main barrier was the lack of transparency and account-
ability (Charles et al., 2010) along the whole recovery process in the city.
We can conclude that the allocation of facilities was oriented to sup-
ply basic needs, but neglected other ones, which reduced community
resilience. Despite the human loss and damage associated with earth-
quakes and disasters, these events can provide the opportunity not
only to apply best practices in city planning and building construction,
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therefore, community resilience, during the recovery process. This op-
portunity has been missed in the case of L'Aquila.
However, the supplementary forms of urban facilities developed by
the community shows social resilience, defined as the capacity of the
community to search for and create options (i.e. proactive capacity)
(Ifejika Speranza et al., 2014) in reaction to the lack of adequate urban
facilities in resettlement locations.
It is also important to remember that a livelihood is sustainable
when it can cope and recover without undermining natural resources
(Ifejika Speranza et al., 2014), which unfortunately is not the case in
L'Aquila. In the physical dimension, the inclusion of seismic isolation
on the basement of the blocks of the new settlements built in the con-
text of the C.A.S.E project can be considered a form of capacity to antic-
ipate, and demonstrates resilience. However, the quality of these
devices included in the buildings has been questioned.
Lack of resilience is a problem in countries with low capacity to an-
ticipate, to cope and to recover. The post-disaster phase offers an oppor-
tunity to reduce the existing vulnerability and improve the conditions of
the community in the physical, social, economic, cultural, institutional
and environmental dimension. It means to build a resilient community,
through application of lessons learned. Nevertheless, it seems that this
opportunity has not been harnessed yet in L'Aquila.
This research is a contribution to the study of the long-term effects of
disasters, which according to Gigantesco et al. (2013) contribute to the
better understanding of the factors that increase resilience, reduce vulner-
ability and improve the design of prevention strategies. Unfortunately,
there is a gap in empirical research related the influence of complex pat-
terns of task interdependency in collaboration patterns and engagement
during disasters, and the effectiveness of collaboration conditions.
Multi-level network modelling would be an option to solve the lack of
empirical research on this aspect (Bodin and Nohrstedt, 2016).
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